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Κατά τάς άρχάς τοϋ 19ου αίώνος νέαι πολίτικα! καί οικονο­
μικοί συνθήκαι έπεκράτησαν άνά τήν Μεσόγειον. Ή κυριαρ­
χούσα μέχρι τότε εις αύτήν 'Ενετία κατελύθη ώς κράτος ύπό 
τού Ναπολέοντος (1797). 'Η ’Οθωμανική αύτοκρατορία παρέ- 
παιεν ύπό τήν πίεσιν τής Ρωσίας καί τής Αύστρίας καί έσπα- 
ράσσετο ύπό έπαναστάσεων καί ταραχών. Ούτω, αί μεγάλαι ναυ­
τικοί Δυνάμεις (’Αγγλία, Γαλλία, 'Ισπανία, 'Ολλανδία) προσ- 
επάθουν νά έπωφεληθοΰν τής καταστάσεως, ύπογράφουσαι 
μεταξύ των νέας συνθήκας έν σχέσει μέ το άνά τήν Μεσόγειον 
διεξαγόμενον ύπ’ αύτών έμπόριον. Συγχρόνως, νέα ναυτική 
Δύναμις, αί 'Ηνωμένοι Πολιτεΐαι, εισέρχεται εις τήν Μεσό­
γειον διά τών έμπορικών της πλοίων. Τά πλοία της όμως ύφί- 
στανται συνεχείς έπιθέσεις έκ μέρους τών πειρατών τών τεσ­
σάρων βερβερικών κρατών τής Βορείου ’Αφρικής: ’Αλγερίας, 
Μαρόκου, Τριπολίτιδος καί Τυνησίας. Κατόπιν τούτου, ή 
αμερικανική κυβέρνησις έφρόντισε νά ΰπογράψη συνθήκας 
μετά τών ήγεμόνων τών βερβερικών κρατών. "Οτε όμως ό 
πασάς τής Τριπολίτιδος κατεπάτησε τήν μετά τών ΗΠΑ συν­
θήκην του καί έστράφη έκ νέου κατά τών άνά τήν Μεσόγειον 
πλεόντων αμερικανικών έμπορικών, ή κυβέρνησις τών ΗΠΑ 
άπέστειλε πολεμικήν μοίραν, ή όποια άπέκλεισε τήν Τρίπολιν, 
συγχρόνως δέ ώργανώθη ύπό τών ’Αμερικανών έκστρατεία 
κατά τής πόλεως Δάρνης, λιμένος άνεφοδιασμοΰ τών Τριπο- 
λιτών. Τάς ένεργείας αύτάς τών ’Αμερικανών διηυκόλυνεν ή 
αγγλική κυβέρνησις, δώσασα έντολάς είς τούς άνά τήν Μεσό­
γειον διοικητάς τών άγγλικών βάσεων, κυριωτέρα τών όπείων 
ήτο ή τής Μάλτας, ώς καί είς τούς έκεΐ προξένους καί ναυ­
τικούς πράκτοράς της, όπως παράσχουν πάσαν βοήθειαν είς 
τούς ’Αμερικανούς κατά τόν αγώνα των έναντίον τής Τριπο- 
λίτιδος. Τελικώς, έπετεύχθη ή σύναψις νέας συνθήκης μεταξύ 
τής αμερικανικής κυβερνήσεως καί τού ήγεμόνος τής Τρι- 
πολίτιδος.
At the turn of the eighteenth and the nineteenth cen­
turies new politico-economic conditions prevailed in 
the countries bordering the Mediterranean. The Re­
public of Venice, which up to that time was the prin­
cipal commercial Power throughout this region, was 
conquered by Napoleon I Bonaparte, and ceded to Aus­
tria, by the treaty of Campo Formio in 1797. Besides, 
the Ottoman Empire had for a long time been tottering 
under the pressure of Russia and Austria, and had 
to face the revolts of the Janissaries and the mutinous 
governors of several of its provinces.
Under these circumstances the principal maritime 
Powers of the time, chief among which were England, 
Spain, France and Holland, tried to take advantage 
of the new conditions throughout the Mediterranean 
by signing treaties of commerce and navigation among 
themselves, and with the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire 
as regards their trade in this area.1
At the time when the Napoleonic wars were raging 
in Europe the Mediterranean became the centre of 
international commercial competition, as the block-
1. These treaties are included in the works by G. Noradou- 
ghian, Recueil d’Actes Internationaux de l’Empire Ottoman, 
tomes 4 (Paris 1897, 1902), t. 2, and Ch. de Mautens, Recueil 
de Principaux Traités d’Alliance, de Paix, de Commerce etc., 
conclus par les Puissances de l’Europe depuis 1761 jusqu’à 
present, tomes VI, VII, Vili (Goettingen 1829). Compare also: 
Γ.Κόλια, Ai 'ΙΙνωμέναι Πολιτεΐαι τής ’Αμερικής είς τήν Με­
σόγειον, Άθήναι 1959, σσ. 1-4. (G. Kolias, The United Stales 
of America in the Mediterranean, Athens 1959, pp. 1-4.
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ades of Mediterranean ports by the fleets of the bel­
ligerent Powers created excellent opportunities for 
profitable trade to European and American merchants, 
whose ships, evading the vigilant eye of the blockader, 
carried food-stuffs and other provisions to the block­
aded. Thus it was quite natural that the competition 
among the above mentioned maritime Powers in the 
Mediterranean should become one of the causes 
of friction between them.
Another cause of friction between the Great Euro­
pean Powers of the time, namely Russia, England, 
Austria and France sprang from the miserable po­
litical and economic situation of the Ottoman Empire, 
as each of these Powers, being certain that the Ot­
toman Empire would soon collapse, looked forward to 
securing the lion’s share of its territorial possessions.1
However, notwithstanding the miserable situation of 
the Ottoman Empire, the Porte still felt itself powerful 
enough to sign treaties of commerce and navigation, 
highly advantageous for its interests, with maritime 
Powers concerned with the trade in the Eastern Medi­
terranean.1 2
Nevertheless the influence of the Porte, in the East­
ern Mediterranean as well as along the coast of 
North Africa was constantly declining, mainly due to 
the power acquired by the sovereigns of the four 
Barbary States, namely Algeria, Morocco, Tripoli 
and Tunisia.3 These States were only nominally subject 
to the Porte. In practice they were independent and 
sovereign Powers, the rulers of which had succeeded 
in securing, even with the most powerful European 
Powers of the time, treaties of commerce and navi­
gation extremely advantageous for them, and at the 
same time quite humiliating to the prestige and national 
honour of the above mentioned Powers.
It was during this time, at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, that a new maritime Power, the 
United States of America, appeared as a serious
1. Concerning the competition between the Great European 
Powers of the time due to the so called Eastern Question, see 
Μ. Λάσκαρι, Tò ’Ανατολικόν Ζήτημα, 1800-1923, Θεσσα­
λονίκη, 1948, σσ. 11-32. (Μ. Laskaris, The Eastern Question, 
1800-1923, Satanica 1948, pp. 11-32) and J.A.R. Marriott, 
TheEasternQuestion, fourth edition (Oxford 1940),pp. 164-184.
2. These treaties are included in the work by Noradoughian 
op. cit., voi. 2.
3. These States, being a nest of pirates, who at this time had 
become the scourge of the Mediterranean, had obtained such
power, taking advantage of the rivalry of the great and small
maritime Powers, and the weakness of the Porte that managed 
to control the trade carried on by ships of such powerful 
maritime Powers as England and France during the 17th,
18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries. Concerning these 
States and their depredations on the Mediterranean trade,
see the works by Lane-Poole, The Barbary Corsairs (London,
1890). P. Hubac, Les Barbaresques (Paris, 1949). G. Fisher, 
Barbary Legend (Oxford, 1957). A.C. Julien, Histoire de l’A­
frique du Nord, tomes II (Paris, 1964). S. Bono, I Corsari 
Barbareschi (Torino, 1964).
competitor to the maritime nations of Europe, as 
regards their Mediterranean trade.4 *
After the successful outcome of the American Rev­
olution, the United States needed new markets that 
could absorb the surplus of its products, and these 
markets were found in the West Indies. But later on, 
and around 1790, England, realizing that the United 
States had become a very serious competitor, tried 
in every way to impede the progress of United States 
commerce. Thus the American merchants, being hin­
dered in their commercial relations with the West 
Indies, turned to the Mediterranean, where they soon 
found themselves subject to the predatory attacks 
of the Barbary pirates.
To face the situation the United States government 
was obliged to sign treaties of peace, quite humiliating 
to its national honour, with the four Barbary States.8 
But, while Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia abided by 
the treaties they had signed with the United States, 
the Bashaw of Tripoli found pretexts to declare the 
treaty between Tripoli and the United States null 
and void, and to send his pirates once more against 
United States merchant ships in the Mediterranean.
It was quite natural, therefore, that Congress, at 
Jefferson’s suggestion, decided to desist from nego­
tiating with those of the Barbary sovereigns, who would 
not abide by the treaties they had signed with the 
United States, and to encounter every attempt by any 
of the Barbary States at molesting American ships 
in the Mediterranean by resorting to force.
To prove its resolution, Congress dispatched a squad­
ron under commodore Richard Dale to the Medi­
terranean in the summer of 1801, with explicit orders to 
blockade the port of T ripoli as the Bashaw of this State 
had declared war against the United States in May 1801.6 *
This decisive action on the part of the United States 
was bound to draw the attention of the two belliger­
ents: England and France. France having undertaken 
by the treaty of Amiens (1802) to recall its troops from 
Egypt, and endeavouring to extend its influence in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, might consider the measures 
taken by the United States against Tripoli as indirect 
cooperation of the United States with England, aiming 
at joint domination over North Africa, though Napo­
leon declared that France would observe absolute
4. Since 1799 almost 100 U.S. ships had sailed into the 
Mediterranean, trading at Spanish and Italian ports (D.W. 
Knox, A History of the United Slates Navy {N. York, 1948),
p. 61.
5. In 1787 the United States signed a treaty with the Sultan 
of Morocco, in 1795 with the Dey of Algeria, in 1796 with the 
Bashaw of Tripoli and in 1797 with the Bey of Tunisia. (W.M. 
Malloy, Treaties Conventions, International Acts, Protocols 
and Agreements between the United States of America and 
other Powers, 1776-1909, vols. 2 (Washington, 1910), voi. 
I, pp. 1206-1211. 1-7, 1785-1787, 1794-1799).
6. C.C. Felton, Life of William Eaton (Boston, 1838), pp. 
256-257.
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neutrality in the contest between the United States 
and Tripoli.1
France had every reason to become even more sus­
picious of the intentions of the United States, when 
the American consul in Tunis, William Eaton, conceived 
a plan aiming at an attack by land against Tripoli of a 
corps of American marines, and mercenaries who 
would land on its shores and cut off the town from 
its sources of supply. To this effect Eaton began 
recruiting a number of men in the city of Alexandria.1 2 
It was then that France decided to take action.
Accordingly the French consul in Alexandria 
tried by every means at his disposal to prevent 
Eaton from carrying out his project,3 as France aimed 
at the perpetuation of hostilities between the United 
States and Tripoli, as well as the involvement of the 
American naval force in the Mediterranean in a war 
against Tunis. In such a war the American squadron 
would blockade the ports of both these Barbary 
States, thus cutting off Malta, being under British 
occupation, even if involuntarily, from its sources of 
supply in Tunis and Tripoli.4
It was natural, therefore, for the government of 
Great Britain to consider that under the circumstances 
Great Britain should offer every possible assistance to 
the United States in the Mediterranean, as by so doing 
it would simply promote its own interests to the detri­
ment of France.5 6Thus, the governor of Malta, Sir Alex­
ander Ball, acting in accordance with his government’s 
instructionsehad given theUnitedStates ships free access
1. See letter of instructions from the French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Talleyrand to Citizen Beaussier, French Chargé 
d’Affaires and Commissary General, Tripoli 15 Jan. 1804 
(D.W. Knox, Documents related to the United States wars 
with the Barbary Powers, vol. VI (Washington 1939-1945), voi. 
Ill, p. 332).
2. See letter to Richard Farquhar from William Eaton, 
U.S. Navy agent for the Barbary Regencies, Dec. 31, 1804 
(Knox, op. cit., vol. V, p. 229).
3. Knox, op. cit., vol. V, pp. 313, 314, 349, 350, 366, 388.
4. See letter from Captain Edward Preble, U.S. Navy, 
to Robert Livingston, U.S. Minister to Paris, France, Dec. 
15, 1804. (Knox, op. cit., vol. V, p. 193).
5. During this period the newly created United States 
could not be considered as a powerful naval Power which 
could help effectively either of the belligerents, but its resources 
were vast and its merchant marine carried on most of the 
neutral trade.
6. Late in May 1801 the British Secretary of Foreign Af­
fairs Lord Hawkesbury informed RufusKing, the United States
Minister Plenipotentiary in London, that the King of Great
Britain had given orders that the ports of Gibraltar, Minorca 
and Malta should be open to the United States ships of war, 
and that they should moreover be supplied from His Majesty’s
magazines in those ports with whatever their necessities might,
from time to time, require, since the President of the United 
States had decided to send a small squadron into the Mediter­
ranean for the protection of the American trade against the 
Barbary Powers (See Lowrie, W. and Clarke, M.C. (ed.), 
«American State Papers, Class I», Foreign Relations, vols.
VI, (Washington 1832), vol. II, p. 496.
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to the port of Valetta since the summer of 1801, where 
American captains could find a safe mooring, carry 
out repairs and supply their ships with provisions and 
ammunition.7
Further proof of the cooperation between the Brit­
ish and the Americans during this time is the fact that 
Ball kept up a particularly frequent and cordial cor­
respondence with Eaton as well as with the command­
er, and other officers of the United States squadron 
in the Mediterranean.8
Among the most important of the letters exchanged 
between Ball and the American officers and navy a- 
gents is one sent by Ball on September 20th, 1804, to 
commodore Edward Preble, commander of the Unit­
ed States squadron in the Mediterranean, congratu­
lating him on his successes against the Tripolitan 
pirates,9 and openly approving of Preble’s explicit 
refusal to negotiate a treaty of peace with the Bashaw 
of Tripoli, who demanded of the United States the 
immediate payment of tribute to that purpose.10 *
It is also certain that Ball had been informed by 
Eaton of the latter’s intention to repair to Alexandria 
and Cairo, as is proved by a letter sent by the governor 
of Malta to Eaton late in the autumn of 1804.11 In 
this letter Ball thanked Eaton for his eagerness to 
carry out any orders with which Ball might entrust 
him as soon as Eaton repaired to Alexandria. At the 
same time Ball was enclosing for Eaton letters of 
introduction to the British pro-consul in Alexandria, 
Samuel Briggs, and the British minister resident in 
Cairo, major E. Misset. By these letters Ball re­
quested Briggs and Misset to offer Eaton every pos­
sible assistance.12 Moreover, it is apparent that Ball 
had sent instructions to Briggs and Misset before Ea­
ton arrived at Alexandria, for, as soon as the latter 
reached the banks of the Nile, near the city of Rosetta, 
on his way to Cairo, he was received by major Mis­
set who entertained him on his boat and offered him 
every service in his power.13 Misset, in fact, played a 
very important role in the cooperation between the 
British and the Americans during this time. Fte served 
as a liaison officer not only between Ball and the 
American officers, consuls and navy agents in the 
Mediterranean, but also between Eaton and the of-
7. Knox, op. cit., vols. II, III, IV, V. 8. Ibid.
9. To Captain Edward Preble, U.S. Navy, from Sir Alex­
ander John Ball, Governor of Malta, Malta 20th September, 
1804 (Knox, op. cit., vol. V, p. 43). 10. Ibid.
11. To William Eaton, U.S. Navy Agent for the Barbary 
Regencies, from Sir Alexander John Ball, British Civil Com­
missioner and Governor of Malta, Palace La Valette, 16 Nov. 
1804 (Knox, op. cit., vol. V, p. 144).
12. See letters from Sir Alexander Ball to Samuel Briggs, 
British Pro-Consul at Alexandria and to Major E. Misset, 
British Minister Resident in Cairo, Malta 16th Nov. 1804 
(Knox, op. cit., vol. V, pp. 144-145).
13. Eaton to Isaac Hull, Commander of the U.S. vessel 
«Argus», Rosetta Dec. 2nd 1804 (Knox, op. cit., vol. V, p. 171).
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ficers of the United States squadron.1 In particular 
Misset maintained a very frequent correspondence 
with the commander of the United States vessel the 
«Argus» Isaac Hull.
Misset had also been informed of Eaton’s intentions 
to come in contact with the exiled Bashaw of Tripoli, 
Hamet Karamanli, who, according to information 
obtained by Eaton, was in Egypt. Eaton would pro­
pose to Hamet that he cooperates with him in organ­
ising a campaign against the ruling Bashaw, Hamet’s 
brother, who had usurped the throne of Tripoli.1 2
Briggs had lent Eaton the sum of 1,000 dollars, so 
that the latter could recruit a number of men in Alex­
andria who would participate in the campaign 
against the Bashaw of Tripoli.3 But, while late in 1805, 
the relations between the British and the Americans 
in the Mediterranean were constantly improving, of­
ficers of the American squadron in the Mediterranean 
had been recruiting British sailors to serve on their 
ships,4 as British sailors would rather serve on Amer­
ican than on British ships, should they evade forced 
recruitment by the British naval authorities. On board 
American ships they had to face fewer dangers as the 
United States was not a belligerent, and they would 
certainly not suffer the rigours of the iron discipline 
of the British Navy, but would receive at the same 
time better rations and wages.
Thus, as soon as the British consul general in 
Lisbon, James Gambier, was informed of the recruit­
ment of British sailors by officers of the United States 
Navy, he complained to the United States consul in 
Lisbon, William Jarvis. Gambier was writing to Jarvis 
that captain John Rodgers of the United States Navy 
was receiving British sailors in the Tagus in Spain, 
while Britain required the services of all her sailors, 
engaged as it was in a life and death contest against 
Napoleon. Thus every Englishman, serving on board 
any foreign ship, was considered by the British Admi­
ralty a deserter from the Navy of his own country.5
Moreover Gambier pointed out to Jarvis that the 
United States had proclaimed that it would observe 
perfect neutrality during the contest between Great 
Britain and France. Therefore Jarvis should require 
captain Rodgers to discharge such British sailors as 
they had entered on board his ship.6
The above mentioned incident did not seem to in­
fluence the amicable relations and cordial coopera­
1. Hull to Eaton, Dec. 24th, 1804 (Knox, op. cit., voi. 
V, pp. 214-215).
2. Misset to Hull, Dec. 31st 1804 (Knox, op. cit, voi. 
V, p. 229).
3. Hull to Eaton, Dec. 24th 1804 (Knox, op. cit., vol. V, 
pp. 214-215).
4. See letter from James Gambier, British Consul General 
in Lisbon, to William Jarvis, U.S. Consul in Lisbon, January 
15th 1805 (Knox, op. cit., vol. V, p. 281).
5. Ibid. 6. Ibid.
tion between the British and the Americans in the 
Mediterranean, as a few days after Gambier had 
complained to Jarvis, Samuel Briggs the British pro- 
consul in Alexandria wrote a cordial letter to the 
commander of the U.S. vessel the «Argus», Isaac 
Hull.7 By this letter he informed Hull that the gover­
nor of Alexandria had sent instructions to the com­
mander of the Egyptian forces in the town ofDaman- 
hur, in upper Egypt, to furnish an escort to Eaton, 
who was to repair there from Cairo, in order to meet 
Hamet Bashaw, as soon as the latter approached 
Damanhur.8
At the same time the British resident in Cairo, 
major Misset, hastened to inform Eaton through a 
letter, that one of his couriers had met Hamet Ba­
shaw, and that Hamet had given him a letter directed 
to Eaton. Misset had this letter translated and en­
closed the translation. Moreover, Misset wrote that he 
was ready to dispatch an express to Hamet, informing 
him that Eaton had repaired to the province of Be- 
heira in Egypt in search of him, and to invite the Ba­
shaw to meet Eaton.9
Furthermore, the British not only facilitated, in 
every possible way, Eaton’s movements, but they also 
did everything in their power to offer assistance to the 
American officers and agents in the Mediterranean 
in the knowledge that British interests in this area 
concurred with those of the United States, and that 
it was most important for the two nations to be agreed 
against a common enemy that might prove fatal direct­
ly to Britain and most injurious to the United States 
in the long run. Thus, on March 19th 1805, Ball sent 
a letter to commodore Samuel Barron, commander 
of the United States squadron in the Mediterranean, 
in which he enclosed a copy of a note, forwarded to 
him by the Ottoman minister in Malta, with a list 
of persons on board a Turkish vessel captured by 
the United States squadron. The Ottoman minis­
ter asserted that he sent this note to Ball after he 
had made remonstrances to the United States consul 
general in Algiers, colonel Tobias Lear, in relation 
to a number of Turkish ships captured by the United 
States squadron, and had received no answer. He did 
so in the hope that Ball would forward this note to 
the proper United States authorities in the Medi­
terranean.10 Finally Ball offered to convey Barron’s 
answer to the Turkish authorities in Constantinople, 
as he was sending official correspondence to the Brit­
ish minister in Constantinople by a British vessel.11
7. See letter to Master Commandant Isaac Hull, U.S. 
Navy, from Samuel Briggs, British Pro-Consul, Alexandria, 
Egypt (Knox, op. cit., vol. V, pp. 306-307). 8. Ibid.
9. See letter to William Eaton from Major E. Misset, 
Rosetta, 26th January 1805 (Knox, op. cit., vol. V, pp. 307-308).
10. See letter to Captain Samuel Barron, U.S. Navy, from 
Sir Alexander John Ball, Governor of Malta, 19th March 1805 
(Knox, op. cit., vol. V, p. 427). 11. Ibid.
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On their part the American consuls, navy agents 
and officers in the Mediterranean gave Ball valuable in­
formation concerning matters directly connected with 
British interests along the coast of North Africa. Thus, 
on November 22nd 1804, colonel Tobias Lear, con­
sul general of the United States in the Mediterranean, 
informed Ball that a revolution had broken out in 
Constantine, Algeria, against the Dey of that Barbary 
State, and that the revolutionists had mustered a 
force of 30,000 men. What was of interest to Ball was 
the fact that Lear had been informed, that the revolu­
tionists in Constantine were assisted by French offi­
cers and engineers, and that their leader was in the 
interest of France.1
A few days later, on December 13th, Eaton inform­
ed Ball of the political and social situation in the 
cities of Alexandria, Rosetta and Cairo, as well as 
of the extremely favourable dispositions of the in­
habitants of these cities towards the British. Accord­
ing to Eaton the inhabitants of Alexandria and Ro­
setta were impatiently expecting the arrival of the 
British, in the hope that they would relieve them of 
their misery.2 During this time Egypt was infested 
by bands of wild Arabs of the desert, and anarchy 
prevailed all over the country, whilst war was raging 
between the Mamelukes, who disputed the right of 
domination over the country, and the Turkish troops, 
under the command of Choursed Bashaw, Governor 
of Egypt. Concluding his letter, Eaton wrote that the 
inhabitants of Egypt preferred being under English to 
being under French domination.3
In the spring of 1805 the cooperation between the 
British and the Americans in the Mediterranean 
continued in harmony. On April 19th, the United Sta­
tes Secretary of Navy wrote to commodore Preble, 
who had been assigned to the command of the United 
States squadron in the Mediterranean in replace­
ment of captain Rodgers, that the United States· 
government considered the cooperation with the 
British in the Mediterranean most important for 
United States interests there, and gave him instruc­
tions to offer every service in his power to the 
British. Furthermore, the Secretary acknowledged the 
services offered by Ball to the United States squad­
ron, of which he had been informed by Preble, who
1. See letter to His Excellency Sir Alexander John Ball’ 
Governor of Malta, from Tobias Lear, U.S. Consul General. 
Algiers. Valetta, Nov. 22nd 1804 (Knox, op. cit., vol. V, p. 157).
2. See letter to Sir Alexander John Ball, British Civil 
Commissioner and Governor of Malta, from William Eaton, 
U.S. Navy Agent for the Barbary Regencies, Grand Cairo, 
Dec. 13th 1804 (Knox, op. cit., vol. V, p. 190).
3. Napoleon very diplomatically proclaimed, that the 
French troops had invaded Egypt to free the Egyptians from the 
tyranny of the Mamelukes; but the French soldiers proved 
him to be mendacious, as they indulged in plundering and 
pillaging in those parts of Egypt which came under their dom­
ination.
had repeatedly in his reports pointed out the fact 
that Ball had in every way and in every instance 
facilitated effectively the movements of the United 
States squadron, and had assisted the American of­
ficers in their operations against the enemies of the 
United States.4
In a report of his, dated April 10th 1805, Preble 
wrote to the Secretary of Navy that Ball had 
expressed to him his desire to obtain two smacks. In 
answer to this report the Secretary of Navy 
wrote to Preble that he would be very glad to satisfy 
Ball’s desire as soon as possible, in return for his 
various services offered to the United States squadron 
in the Mediterranean. Moreover the Secretary of 
Navy sent instructions to Preble, concerning the pur­
chase and the best way to man the smacks, so that 
they could be delivered to Ball in perfect condition.5
Seventeen days after the American Secretary of Navy 
had sent these instructions to Preble, a motley troop 
composed of about 400 Arabs, 34 American marines 
and soldiers belonging to the Artillery Corps of the 
U.S. Army, and 38 Greeks, recruited by Eaton in 
Egypt, and under the joint command of Eaton and 
Hamet, attacked and took by storm the town of Derna, 
one of the most important ports of Tripoli, from which 
the usurper Bashaw of Tripoli obtained most of his 
supplies.6
After the capture of Derna the Bashaw of Tripoli 
had no other alternative than to sign a new treaty 
of peace and navigation with the United States on 
June 4th, 1805.7
Thus, we may come to the conclusion, that the Brit­
ish offered a most effective assistance to the Americans 
when the latter needed it most. But for the services 
offered by Ball, the British pro-consul in Alexandria, 
and the British minister resident in Cairo to Eaton, 
the latter might have never achieved his goal of 
finding the exiled Bashaw of Tripoli, of organising his 
campaign against Derna, and finally of capturing that 
most important port.
Undoubtedly the British cherished the hope, that by 
offering every possible assistance to the Americans 
in the Mediterranean, they might obtain in return the 
services of the United States, through a possible al­
liance against Napoleon, who was deeply concerned 
to annihilate Britain’s influence in the Mediterranean, 
and thereby to deal a terrible blow on the trade of «the 
nation of shopkeepers».
However, the United States Government observed 
a policy of relative neutrality, till the outbreak of the 
Anglo-American war in 1812.
4. Ibid. 5. Ibid.
6. See H.B. Dawson, Battles of the United States, vol, II 
(N. York 1858), voi. II, pp. 59-60.
7. Malloy, op. cit., vol. II, p. 1788.
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